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PRIVATE COST INFORMATION
AND THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE
ABSTRACT
This paperexplores the informational role ofplant location
decisions for the multinational enterprise. When information about
costs is incomplete, the location of a plant will be chpsen not only for
itsimpact on actual production costs, but also for Its impact on the
perceptionof costs as held by foreign rivals. We show that the latter
consideration, which can arise only in the presence of asymmetric
information about costs, may lead to a decision to multinationaliZe even
though actual production costs are higher as a result. As such, the
informational role of plant location decisions is a potentially
important element in understanding the behavior of the multinational
firm.
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The multinational firm is generally thought to arise as a result
of three ingredients.!" A firm must first possess an ownershi2 advantage
(patent, expertise, etc.) whichitwishes to exploit in foreign
markets. Second, locational considerations (tariffs, transport costs,
etc.) must dictate that supplying foreign markets is best achieved with
foreign production. Finally, the firm must choose internalization over
an arms—length transaction (e.g., open its own plant abroad rather than
licensing its technology).
Ethier (1986) has argued that the internalization decision Is the
least well—understood of these three ingredients, and that the decision
between internalization and arms—length transactions is largely an issue
of the international economics of information. As such, to understand
the internalization decision, one must analyze the exchange of
information between agents.
We argue in this paper that the analysis of information exchange
between agents is also important in understanding the location decision.
In particular, when there exists strategic interaction between the firms
of different countries serving a foreign market, the transmission of
information about production costs becomes crucial../ If the location of
production facilities in the foreign market can serve to directly inform
rival firms of an entrant's production costs, or if the decision to
locate production facilities there sigthecosts of the entrant,
then multinationalization can arise as a way of transmitting cost
information to foreign rivals. Consequently, in the presence of—2—
asymmetric information about costs, the role of locational
considerations takes on a new dimension. In this paper, we explore this
new dimension of the foreign locational decision.
Specifically we show that, when cost informaLion is incomplete
among rival firms for a foreign market, the choice of plant location
will potentially have two effects on a firm's profits:it will effect
the firm's actual production costs to the extent that factor-price
differentials exist between countries, and it may effect the perception
of the firm's production costs as held by rival firms. While the former
effect leads plants to locate where actual costs are lowest, the latter
effect need not. Taking the two effects together, a firm may be led to
multinationalize even though its actual costs of serving the foreign
market are higher as a result. Such multinational equilibria, which
arise solely as a result of incomplete information about costs, are the
focus of this paper.
We are certainly not the first to point out the informational
dimensions of a firm's location decision. This idea was central to the
notion of a product cycle as developed by Vernon (966). Vernon argued,
for example, that in the early stages of supplying a new market,
the need for swift and effective communication on the part of
the producer with consumers, suppliers, and even competitors is
especially high at this stage. This is a corollary of the fact
that a considerable amount of uncertainty remains regarding the
ultimate dimensions of the market, the efforts of rivals to
preempt that market, the specifications of the inputs needed for—3—
production,and the specifications of the products likely to be
most successful in the effort. (p. 195)
Vernon concludes that such informational demands are one reason why a
firm would wish to locate in the market it is about to serve. However,
the relationship between location and communication is not analyzed: it
is simply taken as given that locational proximity and effective
communication go hand in hand. The work that we present below can be
viewed as an attempt to formalize one aspect of the relationship between
location and information exchange.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II lays
out the general model and derives necessary and sufficient conditions
for multinationalization to take place solely as a result of the desire
to transmit cost information to foreign rivals. Section III then
explores several specific cases in which the general conditions derived
in section II are met. Section IV concludes.
II. The Game and General Properties
Our ideas are most easily expressed in a general setting. We
therefore provide in this section a characterization of the game in
terms of general reduced—form profit functions. tn later sections, we
evaluate these functions under specific assumptions about demand and
cost conditions.
Consider two countries, one (the foreign country) with a new
market for a good in which the entry decisions of N-i foreign firms
(labeled j—1,2,...,N-i) are just being made, and the other (the home—Li—
country)with a single established domestic firm (labeled N) who
serves the home market and is currently considering entry into the
foreign market as well. For simplicity, we assume constant cost
technologies, that entry is prohibited in the domestic market, and that
there exists a prohibitive tariff on imports of the good into the home
country as well, so that the domestic firm can make its entry decision
into the foreign market without regard to the domestic market.
With regard to the (new) foreign market, all relevant demand
information is assumed to be common knowledge to the N firms. In
addition, all relevant information concerning the production costs of
the N-iforeign firms is assumed to be common knowledge among all N
firms. For simplicity, we assume that variable costs of the N—i
foreign firms are identical, and that they take the form of a wage w*
times a unit labor requirement e. However, the domestic firm has
production costs which, at least initially, are known to it alone. The
source of this one—sided informational asymmetry can be either firm
specific or country-specific../ We consider each case in turn.
In the case of firm-specific one—sided asymmetric information, we
assume that prevailing wages at home and abroad differ but are common
knowledge to all N firms, that the domestic wage w is less than the
foreign wage w*, and that the N-i foreign firms use a commonly known
technology m.However, the domestic firm has available to it a new
technology with unit labor requirements 0 known to it alone. The
domestic firm must now decide whether to "stay" (produce its export good
domestically, facing the commonly known (low) domestic wage w) or to—5—
"go" (open a plant abroad and operate its technology in the presence of
the commonly known (high) foreign wage w*.).! The latter option
corresponds to the choice of multinationalization. Once the domestic
firm has made its (observable) location decision, the N firms engage
in Cournot quantity competition for the foreign market, with the
sequence of play represented graphically in Figure 1 ../
Inthe case of country—specific one-sided asymmetric information,
we assume that all N firms employ the same commonly known technology
o, and that the N-i foreign firms face a wage w that is assumed to
be common knowledge to all N firms. However, the domestic firm alone
knows the wage of labor in the home country, w. It must now decide
whether to produce its export good in the domestic plant or to
multinationalize and open a new plant in the foreign country. If the
domestic firm decides to "stay" in the domestic country, then it retains
some private information about its labor costs, wo, through its
private knowledge about w. But, if the firm chooses to "go" and build
a foreign plant, the N firms all face the commonly known foreign
wage w, and their unit labor costs w*cz are then common knowledge
and identical. In the latter case, we allow for the possibility that a
portion of any plant—specific fixed costs of operating a foreign plant,
e.g., accounting, are carried out by the home operations, and thus
reflect in part the domestic wage w: however, since these are fixed
costs, they will affect directly the multinational's profits but not its
strategic interaction with rival firms.—6—
Thus,by staying home, the domestic firm pays the domestic wage
and faces foreign rivals that are not completely informed about that
wage, while by going to the foreign country, the domestic firm faces the
well—known foreign wage: the location choice in this case is a choice
of information structure for the ensuing oligopolistic rivalry. As
before, once the domestic firm has made its (observable) location
choice, the N firms engage in Cournot quantity competition for the
foreign market. The sequence of play is represented graphically in
Figure1.
Notice that in both the firm—specific and the country—specific
case, the domestic firm's choice of location is important in two
respects. First, the choice determines the firm's actual costs.
Second, foreign firms may (rationally) use the location decision of the
domestic firm as a signal of its cost type, as certain cost types may be
more willing to stay than others. Since the output choices of the N-
1foreign firms depend on their expectation of the domestic firm's
output selection, and since the domestic firm's output selection depends
on its costs, the quantity of output of foreign firms depends on their
perception of the domestic firm's costs. Thus, in making its choice of
location, the domestic firm must also consider the affect that its
location decision would have on its perceived production costs.
We now give a formal representation of the general game. The
first player to move is "nature," who chooses the unknown cost parameter
(0 in the firm-specific case and w in the country-specific case). It
is commonly known among all players that nature chooses a high cost—7—
parameter with probability 6H(0,1) and a low cost parameter with
probability 1H• The domestic firm is then privately Informed about
the realized cost parameter, and chooses a plant location. Letting
c{L,H} and z(S,G} represent, respectively, the set of possible
cost parameters (L 'low,H high) and the set of possible plant
locations (S stay, C go) for the domestic firm, we represent the
domestic firm's location strategy as a mapping Z: C Z.
Consider first the firm—specific case. After observing the
domestic firm's location choice, foreign firms must posit some belief
about the domestic firm's type. Let b(z)[0,i] represent the
probability with which the N—i foreign firms believe the domestic firm
to have high unit labor requirements after observing the firm's location
decision z. We then define JIN(w(z)®ulb(z)) —FN(i,z),with i—H
or L, w(z—S)w, w(z—G) w, and FN(i,zS) —0,as the total
profit to the domestic firm if its technology is actually of type i
but it is perceived to have high unit labor requirements with
probability b(z) when its location decision is Z..Y Finally, define
r13(b(z),z) —Fas the expected total profit to foreign firm
j—i,...,N—1 when the domestic firm's location choice is z and its
unit labor requirements are perceived to be high with probability
b(z). nN(eiIb) —FN(i,z)and 1I(b(z),z) —Fthus summarize
the payoffs associated with the firm-specific one-sided incomplete
information Cournot game In which the high cost technology is believed
to occur with probability b(z).—8—
Consider alternatively the country—specific case. If the doniestic
firm chooses to go, then all N firms have medium (M) costs, and the
firms play a complete information Cournot game. We let represent
the variable profits to the jth firm in this game, with j=i,2 N.
Set-up costs in the foreign country for foreign firms j=i ,2,. ..,N—i
and for the domestic firm N facing domestic wages of type i will be
denoted by F3 and FN(i), iH,L, respectively.
If instead the domestic firm chooses to stay, then the foreign
firms must posit some telief about the domestic firm's type. Let
bEO,i] represent the probability with which the N—i foreign firms
believe the domestic firm to face high wages after observing that the
firm has decided to stay. We can then define iiN(w1Ob), where
i =Hor L, to be the total profit to the domestic firm when it pro-
duces domestically, actually faces a wage of type i, and is perceived
to face a high wage with probability b (the decision to stay elimin-
ates the need for additional plant—specific set—up costs). Likewise, we
can define 113(b)to be the expected variable profit to foreign firms
j=1,2,...,N—1 facing a domestically-located Nth firm that is thought to
pay the high wage with probability b. nN(w1Ib) and113(b) —F3thus
summarize the payoffs associated with the country-specific one-sided
incomplete information Cournot game in which high wages are believed to
occur with probability b.
We look for a sequential equilibrium (Kreps—Wilson (1982)). In
the present game, a sequential equilibrium is simply a combination of
strategies and beliefs such that 1) strategies are sequentially—9—
rational, in that each player's strategy maximizes his expected payoff,
given his beliefs and the strategies of his opponents, and 2) beliefs
are Bayes—consistent, in that they agree with Bayes' Rule along the
equilibrium path (i.e., for events that occur with positive probabilitY
in, the equilibrium). The application of sequential rationality tothe
quantity games is implicit inthedefinitions of the profit functions
above.1" The domestic firm'slocationstrategy is sequentially rational,
if, given the structure of beliefs, the firm with cost parameter i
chooses the location corresponding to the maximum of the set
-FN(i,zQ),IIN(wGilb(z_Sfl} in the firm-specific case,
and [tI —FN(i),frN(wzIb)} in the country—specific case.
For example, if N(LIb) and flN(wHopb) exceed 11 —FN(L)and
ri
— FN(H),respectively, then sequential rationality requires z(L)
z(H) —Sin the country-specific game. Finally, Bayes—consistency is
met if and only if the following conditions hold:
Firm-Specific Case
(1) If z(L) —z(H)—k,then b(z—k) — fork —{S,G}.
(ii) If z(L) *z(H)—S,then b(z—S) —1and b(z—G) —0.
(iii) If z(H) *z(L.)—S,then b(z—S) —0and b(z—G) —1
Country-Specific Case
(1) If z(L) —z(H)—5,then b —
(ii)If z(L) *z(H)—S,then b •1.
(iii) If z(H) *z(L)•5,then b —0.-10-
In case 1), pooling occurs in that the location choice provides no
information about cost type. Bayesian updating then requires the poste-
rior belier (b) to equal the prior belief By contrast, in
cases ii) and iii), location choices separate firm types. Here,
Bayesian updating requires foreign firms to correctly guess the domestic
firm's type. Observe finally that b is unrestricted when z(L) =
z(H)G in the country-specific case, for in this case the S choice
is a zero probability event ("off the equilibrium path") and so Bayes'
Rule can not be applied. Likewise, in the firm—specific case, b(z=G) is
unrestricted when z(L) =z(H)=S,and b(zS) is unrestricted when
z(L)z(H) =0.We discuss these possibilities in rore detail below.
Having defined a sequential equilibrium for our game, we now place
assumptions on the profit functions and then explore the nature of
equilibrium behavior. We consider each case in turn.
Firm—Specific Case
Assumptions
(1) is strictly decreasing in b for all
I c{L,H}, b c[O,fl, z c(S,G}.
(II) flN)0L > TtN(w(z)Øb) for all
c [0,1], z c {S,G}.
(•jjj)llN(ei)> IIN( *ehIb)
—FN(i,z_G)> 0
for all b c[0,1] and I E[L,H}.
(Iv) 113(b,z) -Fis nonnegative for all
c[O,1], j c(1,2,...,N-1}, z E{S,G}.—11—
The interpretation of assumptions (1) through (lv) is as
follows. Assumption (i) says that the domestic firm earns higher
profits the more likely it is held by rival firms to have low unit labor
requirement3 (regardless of its actual technology). Assumption(ii)
represents the actual savings associated with low unib labor
requirements. Assumption (iii) says that, given any belief b,both
firm types would rather locate at home than abroad, but that profits are
positive at either location. In particular, with complete information,
neither firm type would choose to rnultinatinalile. Finally (iv)
guarantees that each of the foreign firms earn nonnegative profits.As
we will show, these assumptions are consistent with Courr.ot competition
under the assumption that w > w.
According to assumption (iii), full information would have neither
firm type multinationalize in the firm—specific case. We focus inthe
firm—specific case on multinational equilibria in which, as a result of
the firm—specific informational asymmetry, one or both firm types go.
The first theorem concerns the case In which the domestic firm chooses
to multlxiationaliZe regardless of its type. We call such equilibria
pooling multinational equilibria.
Theorem 1A pooling multinational equilibrium exists If and only if
flN(w*Gi16) -FN(i,z,.G)> flN(wGIIl) i-H,L.— 2—
Proof: Suppose first that an equilibrium exists with z(L) =z(H)=
G.Then Bayes-consistency requires that b(z—G) H Therefore,
flN(W*oi) -FN(i,z=G)> HN( 0( S)) >11N(0i11)is necessary for
i=H and L, since otherwise z(i) =Swould be selected for i=H
or L instead. Goingtheother way, suppose
flM(w*G1l)-FN(i,zG)> rrN(wohJl),i=H,L.Put z(L) z(H) =Gand
b(z=S) 1.Then, since rIN(w*ehI6H) -FN(i,z_G)> llN(w®l) for
i—H and L, the location choice is sequentially rational.
Q..D.
The pooling multinational equilibrium constructed in the proof of
Theorem 1 is supported by the pessimistic belief that if the domestic
firm is observed to stay then it must have high unit labor
requirements. Our equilibrium concept imposes no restrictions on
b(z—S) when equilibrium has z(L) z(H) 0,i.e., in the pooling
multinational equilibrium, but it is nonetheless important to ask
whether b(zS) 1is a plausible belief specification in this case.
This belief specification would be plausible if the high unit labor
requirement firm were thought to be more likely to deviate from the
pooling multinational equilibrium than the low unit labor requirement
firm. But in fact given the prior belief both have an incentive to
deviate and stay In the domestic country. Hence, there is a strong
sense In which the "credible" belief is b(z—S) — Butpooling
multinational equilibria will not exist if b(z—S) —5H'since
llN(wOiI) > rIN(w*ehlH)-FN(I,z_G)for I c {L,H} according to
assumption (iii).—13—
With the above argument in mind, we follow Grossman and Perry
(1986) and refer to pooling equilibria that are immune to such logic as
credible pooling multinational equilibria. The next theorem is then
immediate.
Theorem 2: Credible pooling multinational equilibria do not exist.
We turn next to separating equilibria. The following theorem
states conditions under which separating multinational equilibria exist
with z(H) z(L) =G.
Theorem3: A separating multinational equilibrium exists with
z(H) *z(L)=Gif and only if nt(woHIi) > GN(w*OHI0)_FN(H,G) and
Proof: Suppose a separating equilibrium exists with z(H) *z(L) G.
Then IIN(wGHIl) > HN(w*OHIO) _FN(H,G) since otherwise H would deviate
and go, while rIl(w*GO)_FN(L,G) > fiN(0L11) since otherwise L would
deviate and stay. Going the other way, suppose that
IIN(W8HI1) > IIN(w*eHIo) —FN(H,G)and
IIN(w*eLIo) —FN(L,G)) flN(weLll). Then the location choice
z(H)*z(L)—Gis sequentially rational, given the Bayesian beliefs
thatmust follow. Q.E.D.
When the conditions of Theorem 3 are satisfied, the domestic
firm's decision of whether to export to the foreign market or to
multinationalize depends on whether its technology has high or low unit
labor requirements. In particular, even though both firm types will—114—
have lower actual costs if the good is produced domestically and
exported to the foreign market, a firm with low unit labor requirements
may choose to locate production in the high wage foreign market in order
to signal to its rivals that its unit labor requirements are indeed
low.1"
Finally, we define a notion of undominated equilibria and give
conditions under which the separating equilibrium is unique within this
class. A locational choice z is said to be dominated for a firm of
type i if the firm makes less with the choice of z under the best of
situations (b(z) —0)than it makes with the alternative choice z'
under the worst of conditions (b(z') 1).Clearly, a dominated
strategy will never be played. As Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) and
Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have argued, it seems therefore reasonable to
require that foreign firms never believe that a dominated strategy had
been played. Equilibria which satisfy this plausibility restriction on
beliefs are then referred to as undominated equilibria. With this
definition in place, we now give conditions under which "going" is
dominated for the high unit labor requirement firm and profitable to the
low unit requirement firm if b(z-G) =0.The unique undominated
equilibrium must then be the separating multinational equilibrium.
Theorem II:Suppose that jiwe'll) > 11N *0H10) -FN(H,G)and that
flN(w*0L10) -FN(L,G)> ffN(wOI).Then there exists an unique
undominated equilibrium, in which z(H) *z(L)—0: that is, the
unique undominated equilibrium is the separating multinational
equilibrium.—15—
Proof: We show first that z(H) *z(L)—0in any undominated
equilibrium. Observe that z(H)G is dominated for I, since
IIN(WOHI1) > rrN(w*oHIo) -FN(H,G).Thus, z(H)S and b(z-G) 0
must be true In an undominated equilibrium. Now, z(L) —z(H)S is
then impossible, since HN(w*GL!O) -FN(L,O)> flN(wOH5H). It must
therefore be that z(L) *z(H) S.Next, we complete the proof by
notingthat the separating multinational equilibria is in fact
undominated and (by Theorem 3)doesexist under the conditions of
Theorem 14. Q.E.D.
The first condition of Theorem 14 is more likely to be met the
greater is the foreign—domestic wage differential and the greater is
The second condition is more likely to hold the smaller the wage
differential and the smaller is Intuitively, then, the separating
multinational equilibrium should be the unique undominated equilibrium
provided that the efficiency differential is large but that the wage
differential is not too extreme. This intuition is borne out in the
linear demand example we explore in the following section.
Country—Specific Case
Assumptions
(I) rIN(wbolb)isstrictly decreasing in b, for all
I £EL,H}, b c[O,1J.
(ii) ON(wLalb) > flN(wHajt) for all b cO,i].
(iii) N(LQ) > 11N —FN(L)> FN(H)> 0N(H11) > 0.—16—
(iv) —F3and 113(b) —F3are non negative for all
b c[O,1 and j1,2,...,N—1.
The assumptions are simple to interpret. By (i), the domestic firm
earns higher profits when it locates domestically the more likely it is
held by rival firms to face low domestic wages (regardless of the actual
domestic wage). Assumption (ii) represents the actual savings
associated with a low wage while (iii) ensures that complete information
variable profits are always greater than fiked costs for the domestic
firm, and that with complete information and facing a high (low) wage at
home the domestic firm would choose (not) to multinationalize.
Finally, (iv) guarantees that foreign firms make non-negative profit.
As we will see, these assumptions are consistent with Cournot
competition when wH > w* > L.
Given assumption (iii), complete information would have the
domestic firm export if it faces the low wage at home and
multinationalize if the home wage is high. Our primary interest in the
country—specific case is on equilibria in which multinationalization
occurs, regardless of the domestic wage; that is, we wish to focus on
equilibria in which z(L) z(H) —G.We refer to such equilibria as
multinational equilibria.
Theorem 5: A multinational equilibrium exists if and only if
NN.Ni —F(i)>II (w I1), I —H,L.—17—
Proof: Suppose first that an equilibrium exists in which z(L) z(H) G.
Then fl —F1(i)> flN(WlaIb) > flN(w1ll) is necessary for I •Hand L,
lest z(i) —Sbe selected for IH or L instead. Going the other
way, suppose fl —FN(i)> r!N(wbsJl), i H,L.Put z(L) z(H) G
and t —1.Then, since 11 —FN(i)> flN(W1,l) for iH and L,
the location choices are sequentially rational. Q.E.D.
As in the pooling multinational equilibrium of Theorem 1, the
multinational equilibrium constructed in the proof of Theorem 5 is sup-
ported by the pessimistic belief that if the domestic firm stays then it
faces high wages. Our equilibrium concept imposes no restrictions on b
In multinational equilibria, and it is thus important to ask whether b = 1
is a plausible belief specification. In one case it certainly is not.
Specifically, suppose that fl —FN(i)> rIN(w1Il) for i —H,L,and
-FN(H)> jN(w}oIO); that is, suppose that a multinational equilib-
rium exists and that facing high domestic wages, the domestic firm would
rather go than stay, even if in staying It faced the "best" beliefs
(b =0).In this case, z(H) —Sis dominated by z(H) —Gin the
presence of high domestic wages. Since riN(wIO) > fl -FN(L)by
assumption (Iii), there are beliefs which might make z(L) —Sthe
optimal choice for the domestic firm when It faces low domestic wages.
Thus, since staying is dominated by going for the domestic firm when
domestic wages are high but not when they are low, the only reasonable
belief is b —0.But this belief could not support the multinational
equilibrium, as it would induce the domestic firm to stay if it faced
low domestic wages. When II -FN(H)> JIN(wlO), multinational—18—
equilibria and thus implausible equilibria. Referring again to
multinational equilibria that are immune to such logic as undomiriated
multinational equilibria, we now have the following theorem.
Theorem 6: An undominated multinational equilibrium exists if and only
if flN(Hj) > -FN(H)> IIN(wHajl) and -FN(L)>
In words, multinationalization is plausible in the country—
specific case if and only if the domestic firm does better when it
stays, actually faces high wages, and is perceived to face a low wage
than when it multinatjonalizes; and does better when it
multinationalizes than when it stays and is thought to face high wages,
regardless of its actual wage. Thus, multinationalization seems most
likely in the country-specific case when perceived costs have a greater
affect on profits than do actual costs. One would thus expect
multinationalization to occur if foreign output is very sensitive to
perceived domestic costs.
The multinational equilibrium is inefficient, relative to a com-
plete information setting, in that it entails too much multinationaliza
tion. Specifically, the domestic firm builds a foreign plant even if
the foreign wage is higher than the domestic wage. When the choice of
location is a potential signal, it is simply not true that firms neces-
sarily locate production facilities where costs are lowest. Notice
however, that when the domestic wage is high, the domestic firm does
receive an actual cost savings by rnultinationalizing.—19—
We now give conditions under which the multinational equilibrium
is unique.
Theorem 7: Suppose that —FN(L)> flN(L11) and
IIN(WHOIO) > riM -FN(H)> flN(H1) Then, in any equilibrium, z(L)
z(H) C; that is, every equilibrium is a multinational equilibrium.
Moreover, the multinational equilibrium exists and is undominated.
Proof: Existence and dominance arguments follow directly from Theorem
6. We prove here that every equilibrium is a multinational
equilibria. The proof is by contradiction. Consider first the
possibility that z(L) —z(H)S. Then b and so the domestic
firm facing domestic wages of type i earns r11'(w1oIH). But
—FN(H)> rrN(wHoIH), so z(H) S is not sequentially rational.
Consider second z(L) *z(H)=S.Then b1. This is contradictory,
however, since rt -FN(H)> flN(WHo) > Finally,
consider z(H) *z(L)—S.Then b •0.But z(H) —Gis then
NH N N
suboptimal, since n (w I0) > -F(H).Tne only remaining case
is z(L) •z(H)•0. Q.E.D.
Notice that flN(H1) < ri -FN(H)certainly holds by
assumption (iii) Is near one and, In general, is more likely to
hold the higher is Thus, if the domestic wage is likely to be high
(I.e., r1N(wImaaH< ri —FN(H)),and if perceptual cost effects are
strong (i.e., 11N(H10) > rI -FN(H)and fl —FN(L)>
then the undominated multinational equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium.—20—
Before concluding this section, we briefly discuss thepossibility
of other equilibria in the country—specific case. There exist
equilibria in which the domestic firm stays regardless of the domestic
wage type (z(L) =z(H)S) if and only if
> It —FN(i)I =H,L. (The proof is straightforward.)
Thus, issmall, it may be that too little multinationalization
occurs, relative to complete information choices. There may also exist
efficient equilibria, that is, equilibria in which z(H) *z(L)S.
Efficient equilibria are easily shown to exist if and only if
rI —F(H)> flI(wHaO).Finally,It is interesting to know that
completely inefficient equilibria —thatis, equilibria in which
z(H) *z(L)G -cannever exist, since the existence of such an
equilibrium would require ON(wHO1l) > rtF(H)which would violate
assumption (iii). Thus, the multinational equilibrium upon which we
focus above is the only equilibrium possibility with z(L) G.
III. Illustrations
Firm—Specific Case
We con8ider a market in which demand Is linear, and where there
are no fixed oomts. Let foreign demand be represented as q -
wherei, > 0, q Is the quantity of goods demanded in the foreign
market, and P is the foreign market price. There are N —1foreign
firms, and a foreign firm that produces q units of output incurs a
total cost of wmq..The single domestic firm incurs a total cost of
w(z)oHq (w(z)oLq) if It makes the location choice z and has
technology 0H (0L) Assume w > w and > >—21-
Tofind the Cournot quantities for this game of incomplete
information, we perform the following maximizations:
___________ LL _____________________— w(z)O
___________ HH ______________________- w(z)0
Notice that each firm (arid firm type) is on its respective reaction
curve. Foreign firms act as it they are playing against an opponent
whose optimal quantity is (1-b)q(b,z) +bq(b,z).






























Provided that equilibrium quantities are positive, it is straightforward
to verify that the four assumptions placed on profit functions for the
firm-specific caseall hold. Note, moreover, that a large value of Y
ensures positive quantities.
We now employ Theorem 11tofind the conditions under which every
undominated equilibrium is a separating multinational equilibrium. The
first condition is nN(woHji) > IIN(W*OHI0) Calculations give
.,NfH 1 2I +B2(N_1)w*—2Nwe!2 \OJII wG 2(N+1)
N *H 121+E2(N_1)w*—(N—i)w*OL —w*oH(N+i)2
(ii) II (w 0 0) { 2(N+i)





For any > > 0, condition (12) will hold if the differential
between w and w is sufficiently large. Notice that condition (12)
is independent of 1.
The second condition of Theorme 4 is IIN(w*®L!O) > flN(QL1)





Notice that (13) is more likely to hold the smaller is the difference
between w* and w. Also, observe that (13) too is independent of 1,
so positive quantities can be assured independent of (12) and (13).
Figure 2 illustrates the inequalities (12) and (13). The size
(and existence) of the shaded region, which gives values of the foreign
and domestic wage for which both inequalities (12) and (13) hold, is
determined directly by the relative magnitudes of the slopes of the two
lines in figure 2, which are given by the quantities on the right hand
side of (12) and (13). While (12) and (13) will be satisfied under a
broad range of parameter values, a sufficient condition for the
existence of a range of foreign and domestic wage levels which satisfy
simultaneously conditions (12) and (13) is that either be
sufficiently close to one or that be sufficiently close to zero.
0
Hence, the separating multinational equilibrium will be the unique
undominated equilibrium of the firm—specific game for a range of foreign
and domestic wages if (but not only if) either the efficiency
differential between L and H is large enough or the (prior)
probability that the domestic firm is inefficient is close enough to
one.
We now summarize with the following theorem.
Theorem 8 When demand is linear and fixed costs are absent, there
exists a set of parameter values under which the unique undomthated
equilibrium of the firm—specific game is the separating multinational
equilibrium. A sufficient condition for a range of foreign and domesticwages to exist which yield the separating multinational equilibrium
uniquely is that either the efficiency differential between L and H
is large enough or the prior probability that the domestic firm is
inefficient is close enough to one.
Country—Specific Case
We consider first a market in which demand is linear, and where
there are no fixed costs. Our initial result is negative:
under these conditions, TIM(wLojl) > TIN(wHo1O)andso an undominated
multinational equilibrium does not exist in the country-specific case.
Consider again the simple linear market in which foreign demand is
represented as q —i—P,where 1,B > 0, qis the quantity of goods
demanded in the foreign market, and P is the foreign market price.
There are N—i foreign firms, and a foreign firm that produces q
units of output incurs a tojal cost of w*c*qf. The single
domestic firm incurs a total cost of cMq0 if it produces units of
output in a foreign plant. If, however, the domestic firm produces
units of output in a domestic plant, then its total cost is
cHq (wLaq CLq)
if the domestic wage is high (low).
Assume that a > 0 and that > w* > wL > 0so that > cM > CL >
To derive the various profit expressions, we consider a Cournot
game of incomplete information in which the domestic firm stays and is
thought to face high wages with probability b. The resulting Cournot











Notice that each firm (and firm type) is on its respective reaction
curve. Foreign firms act as if they are playing against an opponent
whose optimal quantity is q(b)(i-b) +q(b)b.















(22) Jji() - i/B(q(b))2 j=12..N-1










(23) fl 1/[ 3cM2 j1,2,...,N.
Provided that equilibrium quantities are positive, as they will surely
be for large '',itis straightforward to verify that the four
assumptions on profit functions made above all hold for this example.
The country—specific theorems of the previous section therefore apply.
N L N H
We are thus left to compareTI (w mjl) andTI (w o10). It is
straightforward to show that > is true if and only if
q(1) > q(O).
Thus, when demand is linear and fixed costs are absent,
a low wage domestic firm thought to face high wages produces more than a
high wage domestic firm thought to face low wages: artual cost effects
outweigh perceived cost effects. It is nowimmediate that
11N(wLoIl)rIwHclto). With fixed costs set to zero by assumption,
Theorem 6 then tells us that an undominated multinational equilibrium
canneverexist. We thus have the following negative result.
Theorem 9: When demand is linear and fixed costs are absent, an
ndominated multinational equilibrium never exists in the country—
specific case.
Figure3illustratesthe result of Theorem 9 for the caseof
N—2. The slopes of the (linear) foreign and domestic reaction curves
are —1/2 and —2, respectively, reflecting the assumption of linear
demand. The foreign reaction curve is labeled MM. The domestic
reaction curve when the domesticfirm faces high (low)wages is
labeledI-IH (LL). If the domestic firm faces a low wage but is thought
by the foreign firm to face a high wage, then the foreign firm chooses-27—
q(i) and te best domestic response is q(1). Alternatively, if the
domestic firm faces a high wage but is thought by the foreign firm to
face a low wage, then the foreign firm scales back its quantity choice
to qf(), and the best reaponse of the domestic firm ia q(O). In
the general iinear demand case, q(1) -q(0)- > o. In
the case illustrated in Figure 3 with N2, q(1)-q(O) _L(OH_CL)> 0.
Thus, 0N(L11) > 0N(H10)
Evidently, when demand is linear and fixed costs are absent,
foreign perceptions of domestic costs are not sufficiently important in
the determination of domestic profits to overcome the direct cost
effects of locating in the medium wage foreign county when actual
domestic wages are low. This rules out the possiblity of undorninated
multinational equilibria with z(L) —z(H)G in this case. However,
the introduction of plant—specific fixed costs (incurred by the domestic
firm only under multinationalization) and of transport costs (incurred
by the domestic firm only if it exports) allows parameters to be found
under which the multinational equilibrium exists and is the unique
equilibrium. The role of transport costs is to reduce nN(w5ll)
sufficiently 50 that the first condition of Theorem 7 holds
(rr- FN(L) > rtt(wLoJl)), while the role of plant—specific fixed costs
is to reduce rt— FN(H) sufficiently so that the second condition of
Theorem 7 holds (11N(H10) > r1FN(H) > flN(H1)
in particular, in the presence of transport costs t per unit








With plant-specific fixed costs FN(H) (FN(L)) incurred by thehigh
wage (low wage) domestic firm only if it multinationaliZes,profits when
multinationalizatiOn is chosen are given by
1 -6cM2 -FN(L) (26) —FN(L)
1,r_BCM 2
FN(H) (27) fl -FN(H)
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(32) T[(w aH) N+1
(33)fl(wLsl)[Nfl1
Using (26), (27), (31), (32), and (33),theconditions of Theorem 7 can
be evaluated explicitly. It is straightforward to show that, with
FN(L) set to zero for simplicity,
(i) fl
>fl(wLaIl) if and only if t > [C




(iii) II —FN(H)> n(wHosH) provided is sufficiently small
and is sufficiently close to one.
With FN(L) set to zero and costs symmetric, and with t, FN(H), B,
and chosen to satisfy (1), (ii), and (iii) above, Theorem 7 then
implies that in any equilibrium, z(L) —z(H)—0;that is, every
equilibrium is a multinational equilibrium.-1.' We thus have
Theorem 10: In the linear demand model with plant—specific set up costs
and transport costs, parameter values exist which make the multinational
equilibrium the unique equilibrium.—30—
IV. Conclusions and Extension
This paper has shown that when firms behave strategically and
information about costs is incomplete, multinationals can arise from the
desire to transmit cost information to foreign rivals. We have explored
the case of country-specific informational asymmetries where the
location of production facilities abroad directly informs rival firms of
an entrant's production costs, and the case of firm-specific
informational asymmetries where the decision to locate production
facilities abroad signals the costs of the entrant. In either case, the
firm may be led to multinationalize in the presence of incomplete cost
information even though its actual costs of serving the foreign market
are higher as a result. Based on our linear demand example, however, it
appears that the latter case ——inwhich location signals firm—specific
cost parameters —-yieldsthe more plausible multinational equilibrium.
The theory we have explored is clearly only a partial picture, and
should be viewed as complementary to other theoretical work on the
ultinational enterprise. However, it is consistent with the empirical
findings of Swedenborg (1979), that foreign direct
investment by Swedish
multinationals is more likely in relatively high wage countries, an
observation that is inconsistent with existing theories. A slightly
modified model from the firm—specific model explored above would also
lead to the conclusion that foreign direct investment is likely to be
positively correlated with exports to the host country market: just
enough foreign direct investment would be undertaken to signal the
firm's efficient technology, and the remainder of its (now expanded)
foreign market share would be exported from the home plants. Most—31—
empirical work on the relationship between foreign direct Investment and
exports finds either no correlation or a positive correlation between
the two, something which is again difficult to reconcile with existing
theory (see, for example, Bloomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky, 1987).
Finally, an interesting and important extension would be to add a
second period to the game we have analyzed. The domestic firm could
then use first-period quantity as a signal as well. The interaction of
location choice and price/quantity choice as signals of cost Is an area
we plan to investigate in future work.—32—
Footnotes
The existing literature on multinationals, both empirical and
theoretical, is vast, and we do not attempt to review it here.
For a review of this literature see, for example, Caves (1982).
The incentive to share cost information with rival firmshasbeen
explored recently by Fried (1981), Gal—Or (1986), and Shapiro
(1986) under the assumption that cost reports are verifiable.
When verification is impossible, direct information exchange is
itself impossible. In such cases, observable signals such as
price or advertising may be used to transmit cost information,
say, to a potential entrant, as in Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and
Bagwell and Ramey (forthcoming). The signal we explore here is
the location decision.
In both the firm- and country—specific cases, the one-sidedness of
the informational asymmetry Is not crucial. With risk-neutral
firms, nothing would change if the domestic firm were uninformed
about the foreign cost parameter, and made its location decision
to maximize expected profits. Since this adds nothing to the
analysis, we abstract from it and concentrate on the case of one-
sided informational asymmetries.
The third option, that of technology licensing, is assumed to be
precluded for "transactional" reasons. The possibility of
contracting to provide the services of firm-specific intangible
assets to a foreign firm in the country—specific case is similarly
precluded.—33—
Thus,the domestic firm chooses its (observed) wage by choosing a
plant location and paying the prevailing wage. Wages paid by the
domestic firm in excess of the prevailing wage are assumed to be
unobservable to foreign firms. This assumption, which is
consistent with the notion that foreign firms know the relevant
country—specific but not firm—specific information, eliminates the
potential for such behavior to serve as a signaling device.
6/ L H — Weassume that 0 < 0 < a, so that the domestic firm would
never choose to use the commonly known technology a.
This application is made explicit in the linear demand example
used in the following section.
Under our assumptions, it is straightforward to argue that
separating equilibria cannot exist in which z(L) z(H) 0.
.2/ Ofcourse, it could be the home country that has the high wage, in
H
which case it would be tne inefficient (0 )firmthat would
multinationalize in the separating equilibrium and the efficient
(oHfirmthat doesn't, i.e., locates production in the high wage
domestic country.
The four assumptions on profit functions listed for the country
specific case in section II also need to be satisfied. It Is
readily shown that a range of parameter values will simultaneously
satisfy these four assumptions and the three criteria listed
above._314_
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